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The effectiveness of conservation organizations is determined in part by how
they adapt to changing conditions. Over the previous decade, economic condi-
tions in the United States (US) showed marked variation including a period of
rapid growth followed by a major recession. We examine how biodiversity con-
servation nonprofits in the US responded to these changes through their finan-
cial behaviors, focusing on a sample of 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits
and the largest individual organization (The Nature Conservancy; TNC). For
the 90 sampled organizations, an analysis of financial ratios derived from tax
return data revealed little response to economic conditions. Similarly, more
detailed examination of conservation expenditures and land acquisition prac-
tices of TNC revealed only one significant relationship with economic condi-
tions: TNC accepted a greater proportion of conservation easements as donated
in more difficult economic conditions. Our results suggest that the financial
behaviors of US biodiversity conservation nonprofits are unresponsive to eco-
nomic conditions.
Introduction
The decade of the 2000s was characterized by highly vari-
able economic conditions globally and within the United
States (US), including a period of rapid growth followed
by the largest recession since the Great Depression (Poole
2010; Fig. 1). How these economic fluctuations have
affected biodiversity conservation has been a subject of
conjecture but little empirical evaluation. Some authors
see opportunity to slow rates of habitat destruction and
climate change during recessions and to decouple
resumed economic growth from environmentally damag-
ing production (Jackson 2009; Woodward 2009). Others
caution that recessionary conditions may impair biodiver-
sity conservation through diminished government reve-
nues and related program cuts or by reduced charitable
giving to nonprofit organizations (Bakker et al. 2010; Elli-
ott 2011; Sayer et al. 2012).
These divergent predictions regarding the impact of
changing economic conditions on conservation may hinge
on conservation organizations’ responsiveness or ability to
adapt to change. The ability of conservation organizations
to adapt to change has been suggested as a key driver of
their overall effectiveness (Chapin et al. 2006; Kenward
et al. 2011), but has only recently begun to attract study
(Brown et al. 2010; Jantarasami et al. 2010; Baral 2013).
In contrast, responsiveness to changing conditions has
long been an object of study in for-profit sectors (Carls-
son 1989; Garvin 1993; Enlow and Katchova 2011). Eco-
nomic theory suggests nonprofits may be less responsive
than for-profits (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Glaeser
2003), but empirical tests among nonprofit organizations
remain scarce and primarily confined to sectors other
than biodiversity conservation that have for-profit equiva-
lents, such as health care (Duggan 2002; Malani et al.
2003).
Nonprofit organizations play an integral role in biodi-
versity conservation through activities including acquiring
and restoring conservation lands and waters, providing
environmental education, and seeking to influence govern-
ment policies and their implementation through lobbying
and litigation (Armsworth et al. 2012). Environmental
nonprofits (of which biodiversity conservation nonprofits
are a subset) have been one of the fastest growing segments
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of the overall US nonprofit sector in recent decades (Strau-
ghan and Pollak 2008). Yet biodiversity conservation nonp-
rofits are reliant on revenue sources such as charitable
donations, government grants, and foundation endow-
ments that leave these organizations sensitive to economic
fluctuations (Yen et al. 1997; Bakker et al. 2010). The bio-
diversity conservation nonprofit sector in the US is diverse,
with organizations differing greatly in size and objectives
(Armsworth et al. 2012), which may complicate character-
izing responses to change. Yet, just as diverse organisms
can evolve similar strategies to cope with highly variable
“feasts and famines” of resource availability (McCue 2007;
Armstrong and Schindler 2011), we expect that biodiversity
conservation nonprofits may share some general financial
behaviors for responding to economic booms and busts.
In this paper, we evaluate how economic conditions
during the previous decade affected the financial behav-
iors of organizations in the biodiversity conservation non-
profit sector in the US. Our focus on financial behavior
offers a tractable insight into organizational responses to
economic events, although we recognize that bridging
financial behavior to conservation effectiveness requires
further study (see discussion). We use financial data from
the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax returns for a
random sample of biodiversity conservation nonprofits to
calculate “financial ratios” indicative of organization
behavior. Originating from for-profit applications like
predicting bankruptcy risk (e.g., Ohlson 1980), financial
ratios have been applied to other nonprofit sectors to
characterize organization behavior (Tuckman and Chang
1991; Trussel and Greenlee 2004; Keating et al. 2005;
Zietlow 2010). Chabotar (1989) argued that “[financial]
ratios are a much truer indicator of institutional priorities
than any strategic plan.” Financial ratios have been widely
used to demonstrate sensitivity of and responsiveness to
economic conditions for a variety of for-profit firms and
sectors (e.g., Youn and Gu 2010; Giordani et al. 2013).
Accordingly, we anticipate that financial ratios may offer
insights into common trends in the behaviors and man-
agement decisions made by biodiversity conservation
nonprofits in response to changing economic conditions.
We also evaluate how economic conditions impacted
the conservation tactics pursued by a single organization
in more detail to complement our coarser analysis of
cross-sectoral trends. We chose the largest biodiversity
conservation nonprofit, The Nature Conservancy (TNC;
Armsworth et al. 2012), focusing on TNC’s conservation
expenditures and land acquisition practices over the same
decade. This case study analysis of the largest biodiversity
conservation nonprofit allowed us to evaluate if findings
of high or low responsiveness to changing economic con-
ditions by financial ratios were consistent with more
resolved tactical behaviors within an individual organiza-
tion. Our emphasis on the financial behaviors of conser-
vation organizations in response to changing economic
conditions complements studies that instead seek to relate
overall conservation activity to economic growth (Per-
gams et al. 2004; Fuentes 2011).
Methods
Cross-sectoral data
Our cross-sectoral analyses use a stratified random sample
of 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits drawn from an
existing dataset of over 1700 such organizations (Arms-
worth et al. 2012). Sizes of biodiversity conservation nonp-
rofits span six to seven orders of magnitude in the full
dataset and are right skewed, with more small than large
organizations. To ensure representation across this size gra-
dient, we stratified the sample to contain 30 of the 200
smallest organizations, 30 from 200 around the median
size, and 30 of the 200 largest organizations (Fig. 2). For
each nonprofit in the sample, we collected itemized data
for reported revenues, expenditures, assets, and liabilities
from their US tax returns for 2000–2009. Specifically, we
used IRS 990 forms, which we accessed from the GuideStar
website (www.GuideStar.org). We standardized all mone-
tary amounts to 2010 US dollars ($) using the Consumer
Price Index (http://www.bls.gov/CPI/). A minority of our
nonprofits (35 of 90) reported in fiscal years different from
the calendar year; for these organizations, we standardized
fiscal years by calculating averaged monthly values and
summing these into corrected calendar years.
The 90 organizations included are registered in 35 US
states. They range across a diversity of conservation
objectives and business models, from land trusts, to zoos,
Figure 1. Log10 United States (US) gross domestic product (GDP) as
billions of 2010 dollars ($) by quarter for 2000–2009 (black) with
linear regression fit (gray).
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to advocacy groups for specific taxa, to institutes dedicated
to basic and applied conservation research. In general,
growth of these 90 organizations between 2000 and 2009
tracked that of US gross domestic product (GDP; Appen-
dix 2). We included only organizations that filed IRS 990
forms every year between 2000 and 2009, excluding appar-
ent exits (failures) for two reasons. Prior to 2008, small
nonprofits with gross revenues below $25,000 were not
required to file IRS 990 forms, and consequently true exits
were difficult to parse from the more common incidence of
organizations failing to file taxes for several consecutive
years (Harrison and Laincz 2008). Further, environmental
nonprofits have been reported to have exceptionally low
exit rates relative to for-profit businesses (Harrison and
Laincz 2008; Appendix 1).
We chose four financial ratios summarizing comple-
mentary aspects of nonprofit behavior: (1) liquid funds
interval; (2) revenue concentration; (3) ratio of personnel
costs to total expenditures; and (4) ratio of total liabilities
to total assets (Table 1). We used the liquid funds interval
as an index of how many months a nonprofit could oper-
ate based on existing liquid assets (i.e., excluding land
and buildings) if all incoming revenue ceased. We calcu-
lated the liquid funds interval as the ratio of total cash,
savings, and investments relative to mean monthly expen-
ditures. We anticipated that biodiversity conservation
nonprofits should grow liquid funds under favorable eco-
nomic conditions and deplete liquid funds during unfa-
vorable economic conditions. For revenue concentration,
we predicted that biodiversity conservation nonprofits
might exploit more revenue sources under favorable eco-
nomic conditions (something that requires active market-
ing and campaigns) and contract revenue sources under
unfavorable economic conditions. Our ratio of revenue
concentration scales from 1 (single revenue source)
towards 0 (many revenue sources) calculated as the
squared percentage share of each revenue source, of eight
possible categories on IRS form 990, relative to total reve-
nues (Tuckman and Chang 1991). We also included
the ratio of expenditures specific to personnel (salaries,
compensation, benefits) relative to total expenditures.
(A)
(B)
Figure 2. Inflation-corrected annual revenues and total assets for a
random sample of 90 small, medium, and large biodiversity
conservation nonprofits in 2000 and 2009 with a 1:1 line
representing the boundary between negative and positive growth.
Table 1. Financial ratios considered in cross-sectoral analyses with formulas for calculation and expected signs in response to increasing organiza-
tional size (log10 assets in 2000) and more favorable economic conditions (gross domestic product, GDP).
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Tuckman and Chang (1991) suggested that personnel or
administrative costs offer a likely area for cuts during
poor economic conditions. Finally, we included the ratio
of total liabilities to total assets (following Trussel and
Greenlee 2004) because we suspected that the willingness
or ability to assume debts by biodiversity conservation
nonprofits might vary under differing economic conditions
in response to need (weathering a poor economy) or access
(expanded or restricted lending pre- and post- 2007–2009
recession). Instances where liabilities greatly exceeded assets
for a very small minority of organizations (seven) were
reduced to values of one (liabilities equaling assets) to con-
trol the influence of extreme outliers. We log10 transformed
liquid funds interval and arcsine square root transformed
the remaining three ratios for all analyses.
We emphasize that the coarse financial ratios outlined
above do not represent all of the ways that an individual
organization might respond to changing economic condi-
tions. As one example, our measure of revenue concentra-
tion can express expansion of new or contraction of
previous revenue sources through time. However, it does
not differentiate between the identities of these revenue
sources. An organizational transition from majority reli-
ance on one revenue source (e.g., foundation giving) to
another revenue source (e.g., government grants) of equal
magnitude would go undetected (see Appendix 4). For
this reason, we also sought to complement our use of
coarse financial ratios with a more resolved analysis focus-
ing on land acquisition practices of one major organization.
However, we recognize that focused interviews of organiza-
tional leaders might be better suited for some aspects of
more fine-grained responses (e.g., Mosley et al. 2012). As
such, we also include some quotes from leaders of biodiver-
sity conservation nonprofits on the sensitivity and respon-
siveness of their organizations to changing economic
conditions (Appendix 4).
The Nature Conservancy data
We complemented our cross-sectoral analyses with a
more detailed analysis of the behavior of the largest non-
profit in US biodiversity conservation, TNC. TNC man-
ages 16% of total revenues and 25% of total assets
reported by the sample of 1700 US biodiversity conserva-
tion nonprofits examined by Armsworth et al. (2012). As
TNC is primarily a land trust, we analyzed this organiza-
tion’s patterns of land acquisitions in the lower 48 US
states between 2000 and 2009. We included lands
acquired as fee simple (n = 4333) and using conservation
easements (legal agreements restricting land uses by pri-
vate owners; n = 1451). For each transaction, we consid-
ered the total area (hectares), total cost ($ US 2010
equivalent), the proportion of costs that were donated
relative to fair market values estimated from independent
appraisals of property values, the price per hectare of
acquisitions, and finally the ratio of conservation ease-
ments to fee simple acquisitions. We aggregated these
fields across deals done in each financial quarter in 2000
through 2009. All TNC responses were log10 transformed
for analyses, with additional detail on sources and man-
agement of TNC data given by Fishburn et al. (2013) and
Davies et al. (2010).
Data analyses
We sought to relate our indicators of nonprofit behavior
(above) to changing economic conditions. We used log10
transformed US GDP in billions of 2010 $ (Fig. 1) as our
predictor of economic conditions. We chose to use GDP
over other measures like stock market indices (Pergams
et al. 2004) because we felt that GDP would be most rele-
vant to the breadth of biodiversity conservation nonpro-
fits included in our cross-sectoral analyses. As sensitivity
tests, we also evaluated organizational responses to
changes in their own revenues from year to year and the
effect of revenue growth on financial behaviors (Appen-
dix 3). To account for the confounding of GDP with time
(Fig. 1), we performed regression analyses with the behav-
ioral response indicators and GDP linearly detrended by
time (i.e., residuals). We also included in our models
either nonprofit size (cross-sectoral analyses) or financial
quarter (TNC analyses). Quarter was included as a pre-
dictor for TNC because preliminary data investigation
revealed a potential effect of quarter on land acquisition
activities owing to either a preference by buyer (TNC) or
sellers for fourth quarter transactions. For cross-sectoral
analyses, organization size was included in models as the
log10 transformed assets of each biodiversity conservation
nonprofit at the beginning of our study time period
(Fig. 2), with organization identity incorporated as a ran-
dom effect in linear mixed models (nlme library, R). We
also included a set of models that incorporated an inter-
action term between biodiversity conservation nonprofit
size and economic conditions (time-detrended GDP).
Predictions of the role of organization size on financial
ratio responses are given by Table 1 (see also Tuckman
and Chang 1991; Trussel and Greenlee 2004). Pseudo-R2
values were calculated for cross-sectoral mixed models as
the relationship of model fitted to observed response
values.
Results
Three of the four financial ratios considered in cross-
sectoral analyses were affected by biodiversity conservation
nonprofit size (Table 2). Specifically, larger organizations
4432 ª 2014 The Authors. Ecology and Evolution published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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are characterized by having more liquid assets, more
diverse revenue concentration (a lower value by our
index), and higher personnel costs proportional to total
expenditures (Table 2). The direction of these relation-
ships is consistent with the expectation that smaller nonp-
rofits are more financially vulnerable than larger
nonprofits (Table 1). The ratio of liabilities relative to
total assets was not affected by organization size.
Specific to our focal question, two of four financial
ratios (liquid funds index, revenue concentration)
responded as predicted (Table 1) to economic conditions
(Table 2). Further, the significant interaction of organiza-
tion size and economic conditions reveals that large biodi-
versity conservation nonprofits experienced the most severe
increases in revenue concentration under worsening eco-
nomic conditions, as smaller organizations were character-
ized by concentrated revenues regardless of economic
conditions (Table 2). Interestingly, the ratio of personnel
costs to total expenditures was significant but in the oppo-
site direction hypothesized (Table 1). Personnel costs
became a larger component of total expenditures under
worsening economic conditions (Table 2; but see Appen-
dix 3). The ratio of liabilities to assets was altogether unre-
sponsive to changing economic conditions. Despite some
significant coefficients for economic conditions on financial
ratio responses, our low pseudo-R2 values suggest that bio-
diversity conservation nonprofits are not particularly
responsive to changing economic conditions (Table 2).
Our analysis of TNC’s land acquisition behavior pro-
vides an opportunity to test for behavioral responses to
economic conditions at a much more resolved, if organi-
zation specific, level. However, again we detected little
discernable response in behavior. Only one TNC land
acquisition behavior was significantly affected by GDP
and explained a meaningful proportion of the variance
(Table 3). The proportion of conservation easement costs
that TNC accepted as donated relative to appraised fair
market values increased under poor economic conditions
and decreased under good economic conditions
(Table 3). As anticipated by our preliminary data explora-
tions, quarter affected many TNC behaviors, with fourth
quarter preferences for easement deal size as measured by
area, the proportion of easements to fee simple acquisi-
tions, and the proportion of deals that were donated
(Table 3).
Discussion
Scientists regularly express in popular media (e.g., Wood-
ward 2009) or as asides in scientific manuscripts (e.g.,
Bakker et al. 2010) the belief that economic events like
recessions can harm or help the cause of biodiversity con-
servation, yet almost no studies have quantified relation-
ships between economic conditions and conservation
activity (but see Pergams et al. 2004; Elliott 2011). We
propose that the effect of economic fluctuations on biodi-
versity conservation will be determined in part by how
conservation organizations buffer themselves against and
respond to change. We provide the first empirical investi-
gation into the effects of changing economic conditions
on the financial behavior of biodiversity conservation
nonprofits. We found that few measures of financial
behavior were meaningfully affected by economic condi-
tions whether evaluated for a cross-sectoral sample or the
largest individual organization.
There are growing calls to examine the capacity of con-
servation organizations to adapt to changing conditions
(West et al. 2009; Barbour and Kueppers 2012), but
empirical investigations of this adaptive capacity remain
scarce (but see Baral 2013). Our results suggest biodiver-
sity conservation nonprofits may have little adaptive
capacity, at least with regards to changing economic con-
Table 2. Results of linear regression models for financial ratios of 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits after detrending each response and
gross domestic product (GDP) by time, and including organization as a random effect. Results are given for models excluding and including a term
for interaction between nonprofit size and GDP.
Size (SE) GDP (SE) Size 9 GDP (SE) Pseudo-R2
No Interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.181 (0.030)*** 2.968 (1.211)* – 0.206
Revenue concentration 0.088 (0.024)** 2.255 (0.780)** – 0.100
Personnel to total expenditures 0.042 (0.015)** 1.479 (0.478)** – 0.062
Liabilities to assets 0.017 (0.017) 0.584 (0.737) – 0.007
Interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.181 (0.030)*** 8.093 (5.230) 0.866 (0.860) 0.206
Revenue concentration 0.088 (0.024)*** 11.634 (3.334)*** 2.347 (0.548)*** 0.106
Personnel to total expenditures 0.042 (0.015)** 4.899 (2.063)* 0.578 (0.339) 0.063
Liabilities to assets 0.017 (0.017) 1.130 (3.186) 0.290 (0.524) 0.007
Significance of coefficients is given as ≤0.001 (***), ≤0.01 (**), and ≤0.05 (*). Pseudo-R2 is given as the relationship of model fitted to observed
response values.
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ditions. Alternatively, funding processes and conservation
activities may operate on too long of time lags for our
methods to detect behavioral responses to changing eco-
nomic conditions. For example, land trusts like TNC
often negotiate transactions with private landowners and
cost-sharing government partners over many years, poten-
tially obscuring evidence of responsiveness to current eco-
nomic conditions (Appendix 4). List (2011) similarly
observed that charitable giving to the nonprofit sector is
asymmetrical with respect to economic conditions: good
economic conditions correspond with increased charitable
giving to a greater extent than poor economic conditions
correspond with reduced giving, likely because revenue is
often tied to contracts agreed upon years in advance.
When looking across the sector, we found that organi-
zations may grow liquid funds under favorable economic
conditions and deplete them under unfavorable economic
conditions. We also found that revenue concentration,
particularly for larger organizations, expands and con-
tracts inversely with economic growth. However, con-
tradicting our predictions and those of past work on
financial vulnerability in nonprofits (e.g., Tuckman and
Chang 1991), we were surprised to find that biodiversity
conservation nonprofits may preferentially protect person-
nel when economic conditions are poor, likely at the cost
of program activities (but see Appendix 3). Yet the vari-
ance explained by the models remained low, and the pre-
vailing signal was one of little discernible behavioral
response to changing economic conditions. A different
approach might have focused on expenditures (e.g., diver-
sity of programmatic offerings) rather than revenues and
assets. Lowry (1997) tested for such effects of economic
conditions on expenditures (i.e., spending on public
goods vs. fundraising incentives) by 16 environmental
nonprofits in the 1990s. Consistent with our results,
Lowry (1997) found no evidence that external conditions
impacted behavior of these organizations.
Land acquisition activities by TNC provide a more
direct measure of on-the-ground conservation behavior,
but were also not particularly responsive to GDP. How-
ever, the one significant exception does provide an inter-
esting demonstration of the potential interaction between
economic conditions and behavior of biodiversity conser-
vation nonprofits. TNC accepted a greater proportion of
conservation easements as donated in less favorable eco-
nomic conditions relative to good economic conditions.
This result, especially when put alongside a lack of
response in the overall amount of conservation activity
(e.g., easements acquired whether by cash or area), sug-
gests TNC maintains their pace of conservation activity
under poor economic conditions in part by taking as
donations lands they might not prefer under more favor-
able conditions. This behavior also likely displaces some
of the cost of conservation onto state and federal govern-
ments via land owner tax deductions for easement dona-
tions at times (economic recessions) when government
budgets are already stressed by decreases in revenue.
Surveys and interviews of employees or board members
might be used to test our conclusion of little responsive-
ness by biodiversity conservation nonprofits to economic
conditions, and also to further characterize how such
responsiveness relates to meeting organization objectives
and conservation goals (e.g., Brown et al. 2010; Jantaras-
ami et al. 2010). Mosley et al. (2012) used such surveys
to evaluate adaptive tactics of human services nonprofits
to economic recessions, and found results largely consis-
tent with our study: larger organizations had more overall
capacity for responsiveness, but most nonprofits exhibited
little responsiveness to changing economic conditions. To
provide additional context to our analyses, we report brief
Table 3. Results of linear regression models for TNC land acquisition responses after detrending each response and gross domestic product (GDP)
by time, given as totals and specific to either fee simple acquisitions or conservation easements.
Quarter (SE) GDP (SE) R2
Deal size ($) 0.043 (0.036) 3.418 (4.591) 0.050
Fee simple acquisitions 0.045 (0.038) 2.449 (4.838) 0.042
Conservation easements 0.049 (0.051) 10.319 (6.536) 0.082
Deal size (Hectares) 0.085 (0.042) 3.374 (5.328) 0.107
Fee simple acquisitions 0.060 (0.051) 1.423 (6.429) 0.038
Conservation easements 0.154 (0.061)* 11.628 (7.723) 0.187
Easements: fee simple acquisitions 0.078 (0.035)* 1.187 (4.509) 0.116
Proportion donated 0.168 (0.035)*** 3.137 (4.459) 0.392
Fee simple acquisitions 0.147 (0.041)** 0.316 (5.279) 0.253
Conservation easements 0.106 (0.026)*** 6.671 (3.268)* 0.369
Cost ($) per hectare 0.041 (0.030) 0.044 (3.833) 0.048
Fee simple acquisitions 0.015 (0.030) 3.872 (3.826) 0.034
Conservation easements 0.105 (0.050)* 1.309 (6.343) 0.108
Significance of coefficients is given as ≤0.001 (***), ≤0.01 (**), and ≤0.05 (*).
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quotes from a small selection of leaders (executive direc-
tors, board members, etc.) of biodiversity conservation
nonprofits on how economic conditions affect their orga-
nizations and how they respond (Appendix 4). These
comments reflect a breadth of ways that the economy has
(or has not) affected these organizations and the diversity
of their financial responses, whether strategic or opportu-
nistic. Some biodiversity conservation nonprofits “. . .just
got bigger and bigger. . .” through the recent recession
while others “. . .proactively down-sized. . .”, and some
organizations have “. . . nothing built into our by-laws
to take economic conditions into account. . .” whereas
others “. . .approach these issues pretty strategically. . .”
(Appendix 4).
An alternative interpretation of our results might con-
clude that many biodiversity conservation nonprofits sim-
ply do not prioritize responsiveness to changing
economic conditions as an organizational objective. Such
an interpretation might instead argue that many organi-
zations seek to simply balance expenditures to revenues
from year to year while maintaining other financial attri-
butes (e.g., liquid funds interval) in some kind of consis-
tent “fiscal homeostasis.” Related, Zietlow (2010) in a
study of religious nonprofits in the US under recessionary
conditions categorized four financial paradigms for these
organizations, ranging from those seeking to just meet or
slightly exceed their budgets on one end of a gradient to
those aspiring to high financial flexibility on the other.
Similar to our perspective, Zietlow (2010) characterized
those nonprofits not managing for financial flexibility or
responsiveness as “muddling through” or only aspiring to
survival at best, often because these organizations were
constrained by a “current services” trap that led to un-
derinvesting in their own financial flexibility or liquidity.
We believe an argument that biodiversity conservation
nonprofits should not emphasize financial responsiveness
to changing economic conditions is similar: that the mis-
sion of immediate biodiversity conservation is so urgent
that organizations should not manage their finances for
future contingencies or flexibility. Our interviews with
biodiversity conservation nonprofit leaders (Appendix 4)
do reveal gradients of intended or desired financial
responsiveness, and we recognize that adaptation to
changing economic conditions may not be a priority for
some of these organizations. Whether it should be – and
what that means for biodiversity itself – is a topic that
our study invites more inquiry into.
We conclude by emphasizing that efforts to character-
ize effectiveness of conservation activity for the sector in
aggregate remain in their infancy (Gaston et al. 2006). As
others have noted (e.g., Chabotar 1989), financial ratios
provide one method for examining quantitatively the
behaviors of very diverse nonprofit organizations in
response to shared events (e.g., recessions). Given the
important role of nonprofits in biodiversity conservation,
we have considerable and important knowledge gaps in
understanding, and perhaps enhancing, their responsive-
ness and adaptability to change. At a minimum, we hope
our work introduces new tools (i.e., financial ratios),
observations, and hypotheses to inspire and inform subse-
quent studies on responsiveness of biodiversity conserva-
tion nonprofits to changing conditions.
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Appendix
Our focus in the main text is on seeking evidence of
financial behavioral responses by biodiversity conservation
nonprofits to changing economic conditions. However, to
contextualize our study relative to other work on the
nonprofit sector and economic conditions, we summarize
here some additional results on exit rates of our cross-
sectoral sample of biodiversity conservation nonprofits
(see Harrison and Laincz 2008; Appendix 1) and on
growth of these organizations (see Pergams et al. 2004;
Straughan and Pollak 2008; Armsworth et al. 2012;
Appendix 2). We also evaluate whether biodiversity con-
servation nonprofits are more responsive to changes in
their own revenues rather than changes in overall eco-
nomic conditions (GDP), as well as whether longer term
organizational growth in revenues affects financial behav-
ior (Appendix 3). Finally, we report results of interviews
with a small selection of biodiversity conservation non-
profit leaders to provide further texture and context on
the ways that these organizations respond to changing
economic conditions (Appendix 4).
Appendix 1
Exit rates of biodiversity conservation
nonprofits
Nonprofit organizations are thought to have low exit rates
relative to for-profits. For example, nonprofits cannot
redistribute earnings or assets as profits at liquidation,
raising the decision threshold to exit above that to declare
bankruptcy in for-profit businesses (Harrison and Laincz
2008). Harrison and Laincz (2008) reported mean annual
exit rates of only 2.1% for approximately 290,000 non-
profit organizations in the US between 1989 and 2000,
and exit rates of only 2.3% specific to environmental
nonprofits (of which biodiversity conservation nonprofits
are a subset). For this reason, as well as difficulty in iden-
tifying true exits from neglect to file IRS tax returns (see
main text), we anticipate minimal effect of organization
exits as sample selection bias in our analysis of biodiver-
sity conservation nonprofits behaviors to changing
economic conditions. However, cross-sectoral analyses
seeking to identify predictors of biodiversity conservation
nonprofit failure (exits) due to organizational behavior or
economic conditions would be an interesting area of
further study. At a minimum, our analysis evaluates
behavioral responses to changing economic conditions for
a sample of biodiversity conservation nonprofits that were
robust to (avoided) failure between the years 2000 to
2009.
To compile our cross-sectoral sample of biodiversity
conservation nonprofits, we randomly sampled 600 orga-
nizations drawn from a larger set of 1700 organizations
considered in Armsworth et al. (2012), which were parti-
tioned as 200 of the smallest, 200 around the median size,
and 200 of the largest organizations. We worked sequen-
tially until arriving at a stratified random sample of 90
organizations (30 each in small, medium, and large cate-
gories) for which IRS tax returns for all years between
2000 and 2009 were available or could be acquired.
A large number of organizations had missing forms for at
least some years; 145 organizations were evaluated before
arriving at 90 with complete forms for the years consid-
ered. Effort was made to acquire tax forms for nearly all
organizations with missing years; 31 biodiversity conser-
vation nonprofits were contacted by mail, and 29 were
contacted by e-mail soliciting for missing forms. Seven of
these replied with requested forms. Many nonresponses
appeared to be just that: nonresponses from busy but
extant organizations. However, we identified six of 64
small organizations (9.4%), two of 41 medium organiza-
tions (4.9%), and zero of 40 large organizations that may
have failed or exited the sector between 2000 and 2009
(i.e., no mail or e-mail response provided and websites
absent or inactive).
Over our study decade, our total exit rates (above) trans-
late to a mean annual exit rate of 0.6% partitioned as 0.9%
for small organizations, 0.5% for medium organizations,
and 0.0% for large organizations. These values are even
lower than mean annual exit rates reported for nonprofits,
and environmental nonprofits specifically, by Harrison and
Laincz (2008). One difference between our two studies was
that our smaller sample size allowed for investigation of
actual failure or exit in cases where tax returns were missing
(above), whereas the much larger dataset of Harrison and
Laincz (2008) necessitated defining exits as any instance in
which an organization did not file tax returns in any
remaining year of the time sequence (e.g., an organization
that did not file in year t + 1 was not counted as an exit if
it filed in year t + 2, t + 3, etc.). As such, Harrison and La-
incz (2008) note that they “are most likely presenting an
overestimate of exit,” particularly for later years in their
study in which less time was available to distinguish true
exits from IRS noncompliance.
We performed a sensitivity test to evaluate potential
effects of sample selection bias on our parameter
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estimates (Table 2). We simulated organization exits at
our observed rate (above) in a biased manner to exclude
those organizations from our sample of 90 anticipated as
most vulnerable to failure. We excluded 9.4% of our 30
small organizations (three total), 4.9% of our 30 medium
organizations (two total), and none of our large organiza-
tions. Excluded organizations had the largest observed
reductions in assets between 2000 and 2009 (Fig. 2) to
represent those biodiversity conservation nonprofits under
the most severe financial stress and at greatest risk of fail-
ure (Trussel and Greenlee 2004). We then used the influ-
ence ME library in R to exclude these five organizations
from the same linear mixed effects regression models as
applied in our main analysis (Table 2), and compared
parameter estimates and standard errors between the two
analyses (Table A1). In all cases, parameter estimates and
standard errors after omitting a biased simulation of
organization exit closely resembled those from our full
analysis (Table A1).
Appendix 2
Growth of biodiversity conservation
nonprofits
We report here growth by revenues and assets for our
sample of biodiversity conservation nonprofits between
2000 and 2009. We test for significant differences in geo-
metric mean growth rates between organizational size cat-
egories (Fig. 2) using Kruskal–Wallis rank order tests and
against mean geometric growth in US GDP over this
decade with single sample t-tests.
The 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits analyzed
experienced little growth in annual revenues from the
years 2000 to 2009, with a mean value of 0.1% that did
not vary significantly (H2 = 2.873, P = 0.238) between
small (1.4%), medium (4.4%), and large(2.5%) orga-
nizations. Growth in revenues did not differ from overall
growth in US GDP (3.8%) for small (t = 0.906,
P = 0.372) and medium organizations (t = 0.287,
P = 0.776) but was significantly lower for large organiza-
tions (t = 2.890, P = 0.007).
Biodiversity conservation nonprofits saw consistent
increases in assets over this time period with a mean
growth rate of 6.4% (Fig. 2), which also did not vary sig-
nificantly (H2 = 0.676, P = 0.713) between small (7.5%),
medium (8.1%), and large (3.7%) organizations. No orga-
nizational size category experienced growth in assets sig-
nificantly different from that of US GDP (t’s = 0.072–
1.629, P’s = 0.114–0.944). As such, performance by
growth for our individual US biodiversity conservation
nonprofits generally matched growth of the US economy
as GDP between 2000 and 2009. The sector as a whole
still may have experienced growth in excess of GDP if the
number of nonprofits itself increased due to a high rate
of organizational entrance and low rate of organizational
exits as suggested between 1989 and 2000 by Harrison
and Laincz (2008).
Appendix 3
Organizational revenue and financial
behavior
We sought to evaluate how biodiversity conservation
nonprofits adjust their financial behaviors in response to
economic events such as periods of widespread growth or
recessions. One reason we failed to find pronounced
responsiveness of these organization to economic trends,
as represented by GDP, may be that they are more
responsive to organization-specific events, as represented
by changes in their own revenue. To evaluate this possi-
bility, we performed sensitivity tests in which our original
analyses for the cross-sectoral data were repeated by (1)
substituting time-detrended (i.e., residual) revenue for
each organization in place of GDP and (2) repeating the
original analyses with GDP but including geometric
growth in revenue (see above) for each organization. The
first of these sensitivity tests sought to evaluate whether
organizations were more responsive in their financial
behaviors to their own year to year revenue patterns than
broader economic conditions. The second of these sensi-
tivity tests sought to evaluate whether including informa-
tion on trend in organizational revenue, whether growing
or shrinking over the 2000–2009 time period, was
reflected in financial behaviors. It might be expected that
an organization reliably growing in revenue during poor
economic conditions may appear unresponsive to eco-
nomic conditions, whereas an organization shrinking in
revenue might exhibit financial behaviors that appear
counterintuitive relative to a growing economy.
We found no evidence that biodiversity conservation
nonprofits were more responsive in their financial behav-
iors to their own revenues than to the overall economy.
Substituting revenue for GDP in our analyses produced
models with performance equivalent to that reported in
the main text (Table A2). Revenue did not significantly
affect any of our financial ratios with the exception of the
ratio of personnel to total expenditures in the model that
included an interaction term with organization size (Table
A2). Interestingly, this result both complied with our pre-
diction of how organizations should behave in response
to financial stress (Table 1) and contradicted the result
we found for financial behaviors in response to GDP
(Table 2). Biodiversity conservation nonprofits may be
more responsive in managing personnel costs relative to
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total expenditures in reaction to their own revenue trends
than in reaction to overriding economic conditions. This
responsiveness may be more pronounced in larger rather
than small organizations per the significant interaction
term (Table A2), a result likely explained by larger orga-
nizations having a greater proportion of personnel
expenses relative to total expenditures to selectively grow
or cut in response to financial conditions (Table 2). In
no cases where trend in revenue (geometric revenue
growth; see above) was included in models incorporating
GDP were coefficients for this variable significant (Table
A3). Per the results in the main text, low pseudo-R2 val-
ues suggest that biodiversity conservation nonprofits are
not particularly responsive in their financial behaviors to
changing conditions, regardless of whether these changing
conditions are organization-specific revenue streams or
overriding economic conditions.
Appendix 4
Interviews with biodiversity conservation
nonprofit leaders
We appreciate that financial ratio analysis may not be
intuitive to many practicing conservation scientists and
managers. What specifically do our predictions and
results from financial ratio analysis mean? Are they realis-
tic, and do they represent the challenges organizations
face and the decisions they actually make? Financial ratio
analysis has been advocated as an empirical and objective
measure of what organizations do; its lack of dependence
on potentially subjective opinion is touted as one of its
strengths (Chabotar 1989). Further, financial ratio analysis
also standardizes the measure of responsiveness between
all organizations by drawing from financial reporting on
IRS tax returns. However, these benefits come with trade-
offs of resolution and specificity. As an example outlined
in our main text, the ratio of revenue concentration we
used (adapted from Tuckman and Chang 1991) can rep-
resent expansion or contraction of revenue sources in a
funding portfolio, but does not differentiate between
identities of these revenue sources. Consequently, a transi-
tion from diminished reliance on one revenue source to
proportionally increasing reliance on another revenue
source over a period of economic change might go
undetected.
More resolved behavioral responses of biodiversity con-
servation nonprofits to changing economic conditions
could be investigated a variety of ways. In the main text,
we analyzed land acquisition practices of a major biodi-
versity conservation nonprofit, The Nature Conservancy
(TNC), as a means of giving more detail on how a single
organization responded to changing economic conditions.
This analysis largely supported our findings of low
responsiveness of biodiversity conservation nonprofits to
changing economic conditions as observed from financial
ratios. Alternatively, some researchers have used inter-
views with nonprofit members and leaders to explore pat-
terns of responsiveness and identify specific actions taken
in response to events such as economic recessions (e.g.,
Mosley et al. 2012). Such interviews have been applied to
evaluate the responsiveness or adaptability of conservation
organizations to perturbations like climate change (Brown
et al. 2010; Jantarasami et al. 2010).
Accordingly, we supplement our main text here with a
small selection of commentary and quotes from leaders in
biodiversity conservation nonprofits, who we spoke to
following completion of our study. We interviewed five
leaders associated with biodiversity conservation nonpro-
fits across a range of missions and sizes. Interviewed indi-
viduals included a CEO from a regional organization
focused on land protection and wildlife conservation
(Individual A), a committee member from a local organi-
zation focused on funding biodiversity conservation
research (Individual B), a board member from a local
land trust (Individual C), a member of the board of
directors of a regional land trust (Individual D), and a
chair of a large, general international conservation organi-
zation (Individual E). Individual A is affiliated with an
organization located outside the US, although we antici-
pate they share general patterns of financial decision-mak-
ing with US biodiversity conservation nonprofits and
have experienced recent (i.e., recessionary) economic con-
ditions on similar timescales. Individuals B, C, and D and
their organizations are located in three different US states
in disparate geographic regions.
We introduced the questions, analyses, results, and
conclusions from our research in advance to individuals
A–E, and invited open responses on how their organiza-
tions are affected by economic conditions (if at all) and
how they respond to changing economic conditions
(whether opportunistically or strategically). We emphasize
that these conversations do not represent the kind of rig-
orous qualitative studies often used to pursue similar
questions (e.g., Mosley et al. 2012). Instead, these inter-
views serve as a means to provide texture and context
from personal experiences on how biodiversity conserva-
tion nonprofits respond to changing economic condi-
tions. We have edited together quotes from the leaders
identified anonymously above, in a sequence that runs
from whether or not organizations are affected by the
economy (Appendix 4a) to how they respond, both
opportunistically and strategically (Appendix 4b). These
quotes are interspersed with our own brief commentary
and connections to our findings.
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Appendix 4a
We begin with comments on how changing economic
conditions affect these organizations, including two obser-
vations that economic effects could be minor or nonexis-
tent in some cases:
Individual A (1): Our overall growth trajectory from 2002
to about 2013 was pretty consistent. We just got bigger and
bigger. Parts of our region are relatively prosperous, so we
are somewhat insulated from the recession in terms of indi-
vidual giving. Our membership is mostly made up of peo-
ple with higher wages, and they just were not affected by
the recession in the way that people with lower incomes
were.
Individual E (1): We proactively downsized in response to
the recession in case we could not continue to raise funds.
But we actually grew right through the recession, counter
intuitively. This was mostly due to government money or
stimulus money, which was on multiple year grants, and
we really did not miss a beat.
These examples highlight that changing economic con-
ditions, such as the 2007–2009 financial crisis, should not
necessarily be anticipated to affect all organizations simi-
larly (i.e., these organizations grew despite the recession).
Specific to biodiversity conservation nonprofits, our own
data show that some organizations grew between 2000
and 2009 at a pace exceeding GDP, whereas other organi-
zations decreased in size, but in general growth of our
sample organizations resembled that of GDP (see above
and Fig. 2). We suggest that variation in growth between
biodiversity conservation nonprofits over the same eco-
nomic conditions supports our decision to also perform
our financial ratio analysis as responses to organization-
specific revenue patterns (see above) rather than only on
GDP — a sensitivity test that did not overturn our
main text conclusions of limited responsiveness. Alterna-
tively, other biodiversity conservation nonprofit leaders
outlined specific ways in which changing economic
conditions (e.g., the recent recession) affect their
organizations:
Individual B (1): We manage an endowment worth about a
half million dollars. We just try to manage the endowment
sustainably. There is nothing built into our bylaws to take
economic conditions into account for awarding money.
During the recession, we have watched the money we have
to work with decline due to the stock market. So that’s
made us look harder at how much to give out.
Individual C (1): There is a bunch of ways the economy
influenced what we do. We work really closely with local
government officials. When housing developments happen
locally, “over the transom” properties feed into the land
trust. It is not planned, it is not strategic, and those prop-
erties have really variable biodiversity value. So for us,
when the recession hit, housing development just stopped,
and our vein of acquisition just stopped. Everything just
shut down, and it is only beginning to start backup again.
Individual D (1): Poor economic conditions tend to affect
land trusts in two ways: we transition our fundraising to
target wealthier individuals who are more insulated from
tough economic times, and land gets cheaper. Because land
is cheaper in a bad economy, a land trust can really get
more bang for their buck. During the recession, there was
plenty of opportunity for us to go after land we wanted,
but the size of the projects we were able to do generally got
smaller. The poor economy created both opportunities to
acquire land and some constraints on our fundraising.
The preceding quotes show how changing (and specifi-
cally worsening) economic conditions can affect biodiver-
sity conservation nonprofits by reducing endowments
owing to stock market declines (B1), outright cessation of
primary organizational activities (C1), and changing both
funding and conservation opportunities, potentially in
complex or contrasting ways (D1). This latter point (D1)
seemingly relates to our main text results for TNC, in
which this land trust was able to increase the proportion
of conservation easements it acquired at below market
value in poorer economic times. We attribute this as
“donations” in the main text, but note here that this sig-
nal may represent a land market that changed in a wors-
ening economy (i.e., owners increasingly willing to
transact deals below fair market value).
Appendix 4b
Major economic events and changing economic conditions
do likely affect most biodiversity conservation nonprofits,
as outlined by the preceding quotes (Section 4a) and
hypothesized by our main text and preceding researchers
(e.g., Bakker et al. 2010). Yet how do these organizations
respond? As proposed in our financial ratio analysis, do
biodiversity conservation nonprofits attempt to pursue
strategic responses like growing liquid assets under good
conditions; diversifying revenue streams; or cutting person-
nel costs under poor conditions? And are there meaningful
repercussions if organizations neglect such strategies?
Individual A (2): In theory, we approach these issues pretty
strategically. We did do an organizational risk assessment
and flagged a major recession as the biggest threat to us.
And our recession strategy was to diversify our revenue
streams. That was the plan. But in practice, we are always
desperate for money; we are always looking for everything
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we can get. We are very opportunistic. If the public funds
shut off, then we go somewhere else. We will go to charita-
ble trusts for example or seek contract income for services.
But it has been instinct, not strategy. ‘Strategy’ is just mar-
ket conditions cascading onto an organization.
Individual B (2): We formed a committee and did an
analysis on what would be sustainable for our endowment,
and it is a running average of awarding about 4.5% of the
endowment in grants per year. That is about $20k per year
for us. We have gone just over that the last few years.
When the stock market was booming, we were awarding
more money each year. But recently, watching the endow-
ment totals, they have been going down every year, so we
are trying to make a slight adjustment.
Individual C (2): Before the downturn, when I joined the
board, I really wanted us to be more strategic and more
proactive. So we found a property in a strategic way that
we wanted to go after, and we fundraised deliberately for
it, and we bought it. And that entire project straddles the
pre- to post-recession divide. If you were an external obser-
ver looking at our organization, you might think we had
done something strategic in response to the recession. The
“over the transom” properties ceased, so we went out and
bought something else. But it was really a decision we had
made before the recession and independent of the reces-
sion. The transom properties just happened to cease right
as we were deliberately trying to do something big and
atypical for us.
Individual D (2): I think recent economic challenges have
created a transitional period for the land trust sector in
general. Through most of our history, land trusts have
acquired lands or acquired conservation easements and
then flipped them onto public agencies for long-term man-
agement. Because of the economy and budget problems for
governments, that does not happen nearly as much now.
And it means that land trusts are having to think about
stewardship, maintaining our own lands, more and more.
There is a big difference between capital accumulation and
stewardship. Stewardship is this ongoing cost associated
with each property that the economy pushed onto us
because public agencies can no longer fill that role. It’s cre-
ated a quandary for land trusts, because donors are more
into acquiring land than managing it. Donors are not
always interested in building trails, or thinning forest to
promote old growth, or prescribed fire. It creates a real
fundraising challenge for us. And it matters regardless of
what happens in the future. If we cannot find an agency to
take these lands, then they are ours to maintain indefi-
nitely. And if at some point in the future a public agency
does want to take these lands, we have to have maintained
them so that they are in a condition that the agency is still
interested in them.
Many of these preceding quotes interface in interesting
ways with predictions from our financial ratio analysis.
Our expectation that organizations should grow revenue
sources (which requires considerable upfront costs; see A3
below) during good times is supported by A2 as a prere-
cessionary strategy. Our prediction that organizations
(and especially larger organizations) might cut personnel
costs as a means of buffering programmatic offerings dur-
ing poor economic conditions is supported by E1,
although this organization’s subsequent growth through
the recession suggests this deliberate strategy was prema-
ture. Further, D2 highlights reasons why growing liquid
assets during favorable economic times may be prudent.
A land trust acquiring properties with no intention of
retaining them for management, owing to typical transfer
to government agencies, would not anticipate a need to
grow a “stewardship endowment” to maintain these prop-
erties indefinitely (i.e., growing liquid assets). Under a
changed economic reality in which government agencies
are unable to assume management of these properties, the
same land trust can find itself without the financial
resources — and fundraising capacity to develop the
financial resources — to manage these properties indefi-
nitely. We would urge biodiversity conservation nonpro-
fits to apply foresight in developing financial assets (i.e.,
growing liquid assets) proportional to potential future
need during good economic conditions, even at the cost
of some desired or possible conservation activity (i.e.,
land acquisition itself).
Alternatively, the preceding quotes also emphasize ways
in which these organizations are not able to respond stra-
tegically — even if desired — to changing economic con-
ditions. A2 reports that their organization aspires to be
strategic in theory, but is generally opportunistic in prac-
tice (i.e., always looking for any available funding) regard-
less of economic conditions — a scenario we would
anticipate is common to many biodiversity conservation
nonprofits. B2 is a small organization that is responsive
but not particularly strategic with respect to economic
conditions; they award less of their endowment to fund
research when economic conditions are poor, but gener-
ally aspire to a similar level of activity from year to year.
C2 relates an instance in which a novel strategic land
acquisition by their trust just happened to coincide with
a major economic change, but was not precipitated by
the change itself. In this case, an activity planned and ini-
tiated prior to a change in economic conditions was not
enacted until after a major economic perturbation, dem-
onstrating one way in which time lags may obscure or
confuse responsiveness of biodiversity conservation nonp-
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rofits to changing economic conditions (see also E1
above). We discuss such lags, and their implications for
our analyses and management of biodiversity conserva-
tion nonprofits, at some length in the main text.
We conclude with a brief selection of quotes that were
surprising or unexpected with respect to how biodiversity
conservation nonprofits were affected by, or responded
to, changing economic conditions:
Individual A (3): We identified membership as an impor-
tant area to grow, before the recession and independent of
the recession. But it costs money. To grow membership,
you have to employ people and you have to ask a lot of
people. We used an external consultancy, and they charge
commission for new membership. They were very success-
ful for us in growing our membership, but lots of these
external consultancies went bust during the recession. They
had a kind of bad financial model. Because they operated
on commission, during the recession, they had to ask more
people to join an organization to get the same number to
join as before, so they were doing more work with less
income. Our external consultancy went bust in 2010. Inci-
dentally, we actually went out and hired a bunch of their
employees. We just brought them in-house and developed
that capacity. And we are doing better now! Our profit
from membership recruitment has gone up since the
recession.
Individual D (3): Something else that is really important is
that when economic times are bad, we collaborate and
leverage resources with other organizations more so than
when times are good. It is not that we do not collaborate
when times are good, but those collaborations are more
strategic and more carefully defined. When the economy is
bad, we are really willing to collaborate much more broadly
and opportunistically.
A3 relates a fascinating example in which a potential
hardship induced by poor economic conditions (a hired
consultancy went bankrupt) ultimately resulted in an effi-
ciency gain for the organization, in which they were able
to hire some of the consultancy’s previous employees and
subsequently lower costs associated with fundraising by
membership. Finally, D3 relates just one aspect of respon-
siveness to changing economic conditions that our main
text analyses cannot account for: context-dependent pat-
terns of collaboration and cooperation between organiza-
tions (e.g., Bode et al. 2010) in response to changing
economic conditions. We highlight this example simply
to emphasize that our efforts at characterizing responses
of biodiversity conservation nonprofits to changing eco-
nomic conditions are not intended as the complete story,
but rather a starting point for any number of such inves-
tigations into organizational behavior (and hopefully
organizational effectiveness) that could be pursued.
Table A1. Results of linear regression models for financial ratios of 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits after detrending each response and
GDP by time, and including organization as a random effect. Results are given for models excluding and including a term for interaction between
nonprofit size and GDP. Sample selection bias has been simulated by excluding three small and two medium organizations with the largest loss in
assets between 2000 and 2009 (Fig. 2). The percent change in parameter estimates relative to the full model (Table 2) is also given.
Size (SE); % GDP (SE); % Size 9 GDP (SE); %
No interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.180 (0.030); 0.21 2.827 (1.218); 4.99 –
Revenue concentration 0.088 (0.024); 0.15 2.282 (0.787); 1.20 –
Personnel:Expenditures 0.042 (0.015); 0.01 1.432 (0.480); 3.27 –
Liabilities:Assets 0.017 (0.017); 1.54 0.480 (0.741); 21.65 –
Interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.180 (0.03); 0.21 7.495 (5.256); 7.99 0.787 (0.863); 9.98
Revenue concentration 0.88 (0.024); 0.12 11.581 (3.362); 0.45 2.339 (0.552); 0.35
Personnel:Expenditures 0.042 (0.015); 0.01 4.825 (2.069); 1.54 0.572 (0.034); 0.98
Liabilities:Assets 0.017 (0.017); 1.52 1.597 (3.200); 29.29 0.351 (0.525); 17.38
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Table A3. Results of linear regression models for financial ratios of 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits after detrending each response and
GDP by time, and including organization as a random effect. These models also evaluate whether geometric growth in revenue over the time per-
iod (2000–2009) for each biodiversity conservation nonprofit affects their financial behaviors as manifested by financial ratios. As in the main text,
results are given for models excluding and including a term for interaction between nonprofit size and GDP.
Size (SE) GDP (SE) Size 9 GDP (SE) Revenue (SE) Pseudo-R2
No interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.181 (0.030)*** 2.968 (1.211)* – 0.008 (0.213) 0.206
Revenue concentration 0.089 (0.024)** 2.255 (0.780)** – 0.175 (0.171) 0.108
Personnel to total expend 0.042 (0.015)** 1.479 (0.478)** – 0.030 (0.109) 0.063
Liabilities to assets 0.017 (0.017) 0.0584 (0.737) – 0.044 (0.119) 0.008
Interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.181 (0.030)*** 8.093 (5.230) 0.866 (0.860) 0.008 (0.213) 0.206
Revenue concentration 0.088 (0.024)*** 11.634 (3.334)*** 2.347 (0.548)*** 0.175 (0.171) 0.113
Personnel to total expend 0.042 (0.016)** 4.899 (2.063)* 0.578 (0.339) 0.030 (0.109) 0.063
Liabilities to assets 0.017 (0.017) 1.130 (3.186) 0.290 (0.524) 0.044 (0.119) 0.008
Significance of coefficients is given as ≤0.001 (***), ≤0.01 (**), and ≤0.05 (*). Pseudo-R2 is given as the relationship of model fitted to observed
response values.
Table A2. Results of linear regression models for financial ratios of 90 biodiversity conservation nonprofits after detrending each response and
annual revenues by time, and including organization as a random effect. Results are given for models excluding and including a term for interac-
tion between nonprofit size and annual revenue.
Size (SE) Revenue (SE) Size 9 Rev (SE) Pseudo-R2
No interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.181 (0.030)*** 0.031 (0.032) – 0.204
Revenue concentration 0.088 (0.024)** 0.028 (0.020) – 0.098
Personnel to total expend 0.042 (0.015)** 0.017 (0.012) – 0.060
Liabilities to assets 0.017 (0.017) 0.011 (0.019) – 0.007
Interaction
Liquid funds interval 0.181 (0.184)*** 0.133 (0.093) 0.018 (0.015) 0.204
Revenue concentration 0.088 (0.024)** 0.115 (0.059) 0.025 (0.010)* 0.100
Personnel to total expend 0.042 (0.015)** 0.123 (0.036)** 0.019 (0.006)* 0.063
Liabilities to assets 0.017 (0.017) 0.019 (0.056) 0.001 (0.009) 0.007
Significance of coefficients is given as ≤0.001 (***), ≤0.01 (**), and ≤0.05 (*). Pseudo-R2 is given as the relationship of model fitted to observed
response values.
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